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Abstract 
With the Portuguese financial crisis, companies had to struggle to be able 
to overcome the difficulties. Some were able to manage those difficulties, 
but others did not have the possibility to maintain their activity and had to 
close the doors. But how were their financial constraints affected? What 
was the impact that the crisis had on small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs)? To answer these questions, this study analyses the impact of the 
recent financial crisis and the sovereign credit rating downgrade of 2011 
on the financial constraints of Portuguese SMEs, in a way to understand 
the difficulties that they faced (or still face) after the crisis. 
In this dissertation is used the Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) approach 
since their analysis also focus only private firms. According to their 
methodology, three hypotheses should be tested based on the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash, the cash flow sensitivity of investment and cash 
holdings. If a firm is financially constrained, these factors should increase. 
In this case, the results obtained are not the expected because the three 
hypothesis purposed are all rejected, indicating that private firms and, 
more specifically, SMEs were not financially constrained after the financial 
crisis and the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2011. 
However, this may not mean that companies were well, but instead that 
they were even worse than expected, since they did not have the 
possibility to save cash to finance future investments, nor to retain the 
cash obtained from the cash inflows or even were not able to use their 
cash flows to invest.  
 
 
Keywords: SMEs; financial constraints; cash holdings; cash flow sensitive 
of cash; cash flow sensitivity of investment; financial crisis; sovereign 
credit rating
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Resumo 
Com a crise financeira Portuguesa, as empresas tiveram de batalhar para 
ultrapassar as dificuldades. Algumas foram capazes de lidar com essas 
dificuldades, mas outras não tiveram a possibilidade de manter a sua 
atividade e tiveram de fechar as portas. Mas como é que foram afectadas 
as suas restrições financeiras? Qual o impacto que a crise teve nas 
pequenas e medias empresas (PMEs)? Para responder a estas questões, 
este estudo analisa o impacto da recente crise financeira e da descida do 
rating soberano em 2011 nas restrições financeiras das PMEs 
Portuguesas, de forma a perceber as dificuldades que estas enfrentaram 
(ou que ainda enfrentam) depois da crise. 
Nesta dissertação é utilizada a abordagem de Erel, Jang and Weisbach 
(2015), uma vez que estes autores também focam o seu estudo em 
empresas privadas. De acordo com a sua metodologia, três hipóteses 
devem ser testadas com base na sensibilidade de caixa ao cash flow, 
sensibilidade do investimento ao cash flow e acumulação de liquidez. Se 
uma empresa está financeiramente restringida, estes fatores devem 
aumentar. Neste caso, os resultados obtidos não são os esperados, pois 
as três hipóteses propostas são todas rejeitadas indicando que as 
empresas privadas e, mais especificamente, as PMEs não estavam 
restringidas financeiramente depois da crise financeira e da descida do 
rating soberano Português em 2011. Contudo, isto pode não significar que 
as empresas estavam bem, mas sim que elas estavam ainda piores do 
que se esperava, uma vez que não tinham possibilidade de poupar 
dinheiro para financiar futuros investimentos, nem para reter dinheiro 
proveniente dos cash inflows ou nem foram capazes de utilizar os cash 
flows para investir. 
Palavras-chave: PMEs; restrições financeiras; acumulação de liquidez; 
sensibilidade de caixa ao cash flow; sensibilidade do investimento ao cash 
flow; crise financeira; rating do crédito soberano 
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A. Introduction and Motivations 
 
 In recent years, the world financial system has been facing one of the 
biggest financial crises. This crisis had its blast in 2007 with the collapse of 
subprime mortgages having a tremendous impact in Europe. When the crisis 
began in the United States because of the subprime mortgages, the Portuguese 
GDP was increasing at its best. Portuguese banks were having a more 
conservative position by lowering their exposure to financial products that were 
affected by the subprime crisis.1 However, in the end of 2008 the crisis started 
to have spillover effects in Europe and started to spread to several countries 
being Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus the most affected. All of 
these countries had the need to request assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Portugal requested financial support in April 2011, and in 
May of that year the Economic Adjustment Program was negotiated between 
the Portuguese government and the financial institutions. Because of this need 
of assistance from these institutions, investors were concerned about Portugal 
capacity to fulfill its commitments. This brought the mistrust from investors in 
relation to Portugal and that was reflected when rating agencies began to 
decrease its rating. In the end of 2011 Portugal was considered a country with a 
“junk” status, i.e., it was placed in the Speculative grade or Non-Investment 
grade group, which is the rating level for a debtor that has high vulnerability to 
default risk in adverse changes in economic and business conditions and has 
high probability to be unable to meet its financial obligations2. 
 As a result of this financial crisis, countries faced the need to issue more 
debt. Domestic banks bought most of the debt since governments have high 
influence on those banks through direct ownership or board position (Becker 
and Ivashina, 2014). Because of this increase in the sovereign debt holdings 
the corporate loan supply decreased and companies had difficulties to have 
access to credit. Becker and Ivashina (2014) argue that in periods of crisis the 
                                                        
1
 Pereira, P. T., and Wemans, L. (2012) 
2 
Fitch Ratings – Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion (December 2014) 
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sovereign debt was a risky investment for banks, so they had to reduce the 
amount of money available to companies and, as a consequence, companies 
had to reduce their investments. 
 To overcome this problem, firms with access to the bond market started 
to issue more bonds, but those companies that were not able to do this, i.e., the 
small ones, were not able to have access to such financing mechanisms. The 
main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the financial constraints of private 
firms and, more specifically, SMEs after the recent financial crisis and after the 
sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2011. The quantity of money that firms had 
access is an important factor to analyze since it could be a way for firms to 
survive to the crisis. As a result of the crisis and the rating downgrade, the 
amount of loans to SMEs began to decrease significantly during the period of 
2010-2012 (Figure 1). 
  
 
  
Figure 1 - Trends in outstanding SME loans 2010 – 2012 (year growth rates) 
Source: OECD (2014), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard 
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 But the government tried to revert this situation by proposing some anti-
crisis measures that could give SMEs more easy access to financing and to 
give support to the companies’ fixed investment and working capital. The 
Portuguese government launched credit lines of a total of €12.2 billion, with 
subsidies between 50% and 75% of the loan and with longer maturities.3 During 
the period of 2007-2012 the amount of loans available to SMEs was more than 
half comparatively to the total business loans, but after Portugal requested 
assistance to the International Monetary Fund the amount of money available to 
lend to small and medium enterprises was the lowest since the beginning of the 
crisis (Figure 2). This combined with the austerity imposed by the Portuguese 
government, led companies to have more financial difficulties and some of them 
even had to cease their activities (see Table 1). Every year since the beginning 
of the financial crisis the number of bankruptcies has been growing, having a 
notable difference of almost 2000 companies closing just between 2011 to 
                                                        
3
 Financing SMEs and Enterpreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard  (2014). Document that analyses the 
access of SMEs to financing of 31 countries in the period of 2007-2012 
Figure 2 - SME loans and total business loans, 2007-2012 
Source: OECD (2014), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard 
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2012, reaching a frightening number of 6.688 bankruptcies only in 2012 (Table 
1). 
 According to the OECD Scoreboard of 2014, the number of loans 
supplied to SMEs had a consistent tendency to decrease since 2010. With the 
crisis came the high risk, which led banks to require their borrowers more strict 
lending conditions causing the loans to decrease (Table 1). Banks took this 
position because the risk of not receiving the payment of loans by companies 
was high and that is seen in Table 1 in the payment delays that started to 
increase in 2008. 
Table 1 – Scoreboard for Portugal 2007-2012 
Source: OECD (2014), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD Scoreboard 
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 With the financial crisis in Portugal came a sovereign credit rating 
downgrade.  Since 2009 that Portugal saw it sovereign credit rating to decline 
gradually, but in 2011, the year of the intervention of IMF and European 
institutions, the Portuguese sovereign credit rating fell to a level that positioned 
Portugal in the Speculative Grade group. This had a huge impact on 
Portuguese companies, not only on the PSI-20 (Portuguese Stock Index) 
companies but, most importantly, in SMEs. This is the reason why the main 
purpose of this dissertation is to study how the crisis affected the financial 
constraints of SMEs. After all, SMEs were the most affected by the financial 
crisis in Portugal, because comparatively to larger firms they had to struggle 
(and some of them still do) to survive to the crisis. 
 As mentioned, the Portuguese financial crisis had several consequences 
on small and medium enterprises. Therefore, this dissertation analyzes the 
impact of the sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2011 and, in general, the 
impact of the financial crisis in Portugal on the financial constraints of small and 
medium enterprises. To do this analysis the financial constraints are studied in 
the level of cash holdings, cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash flow sensitivity 
of investment by following the methodology of Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015). 
This methodology is followed because their study is similar to what it is applied 
in this dissertation, but instead of analyzing the impact of acquisitions, is on the 
impact of the crisis on SMEs that I will focus. The method of these authors it is a 
more appropriate and suitable approach to follow since their objective was to 
study private firms and this dissertation will also address only private firms. 
What is expected from this study is that it will help to understand how SMEs 
were affected by the crisis and the 2011 sovereign credit rating downgrade and 
how they had to change their policies to survive. 
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B. Literature Review 
 
 Throughout the years, there have been several studies about financial 
constraints of firms. The 2007-2009 financial crisis has made this topic much 
more crucial and the analysis of the financial constraints of small and medium 
enterprises became an important issue to understand how these firms were 
affected by one of the biggest financial crisis in Europe. In this section, is briefly 
described some of the most important literature about financial constraints and 
sovereign credit rating. First, it will be analyzed literature about financial 
constraints, specifically about the three main subjects that will be tested: cash 
holdings, investment-cash flow sensitivity and cash-cash flow sensitivity. Then, 
some literature about sovereign credit rating is presented making a relation with 
financial constraints. 
 
B.1. Financial Constraints 
 
  During the financial crisis, the Portuguese sovereign credit rating started 
to decrease regularly. To many companies this crisis was their path to darkest 
times. Some of them were able to overcome the difficulties despite of the impact 
that it had on them and on their financial constraints, but others did not have the 
possibility to maintain their activity and had to close the doors. In this section 
are described some studies about financial constraints to better understand 
what are these and how they can be affected by the crisis. 
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B.1.1. Cash Holdings 
 
 The financial constraints topic it is not a recent one. Back in 1936, John 
Maynard Keynes defended that to protect themselves against future financial 
constraints, firms hold cash if there are frictions in the financial markets.4 
 The European financial crisis has led SMEs to change their saving 
policies. Along with the crisis, external finance became more costly and the 
concern on how to finance current and future investments was larger. With 
more expensive external finance, SMEs saw the need to save more cash in a 
way to finance their future investments.5 The results of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (1999) confirm this fact. According to their results, smaller firms, 
firms that have more growth opportunities are the ones that hold more cash and 
liquid assets so that they can continue to invest in the future when external 
financing is costly. 
 The need of firms to invest makes them to hold cash, and this is even 
more necessary when they are facing financial constraints. Holding cash 
becomes a need for small firms because with the crisis resorting to external 
finance is almost unbearable for them. 
 
B.1.2. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 
 In 1988, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen present a way to measure 
financial constraints through investment and the cost of capital. According to 
them, variations in cash flow affect more the investment of constrained firms 
than that of less constrained firms. When firms are financially constrained, it is 
not just the positive NPV (Net Present Value) projects that influence the 
investment spending, but the internal funds that are available to the firm are 
also an important factor, i.e., investment can be sensitive to the movements in 
cash flow.6 
                                                        
4
 Keynes, J. M. (1936) 
5
 Riddick and Whited (2009) 
6
 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
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 A different point of view to that of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
was the study of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). These authors analyze the 
relation between financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities, 
and in contrast to what Fazzari et al (1988) argue, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
reach the conclusion that financially constrained firms do not have high 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow, but firms that have high sensitivity are the 
less constrained. A firm is more financially constrained when there is an 
increase in the wedge between its external and internal cost of funds. 
Unconstrained firms are the ones that have more liquid assets (cash) and rely 
mostly on internal funds rather than external funds to invest even though they 
have access to them, which make these firms to have higher cash flow 
sensitivity of investment.7   
 In accordance with Kaplan and Zingales (1997), are Alti (2003) and 
Moyen (2004). Alti (2003) defends that the patterns showed by Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) are only consistent if a firm is financially 
unconstrained. According to Moyen (2004), if we use an unconstrained model 
(low dividend firms) to see if firms are constrained, we obtain the results of 
Fazzari et al (1988), and when we use a constrained model we reach the 
results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
 Almeida and Campello (2007) develop the idea that, when firms have 
insufficient access to credit, variables that increase the access of firms to 
external financing can also increase the investment of those firms. Their main 
focus was the tangibility of a firm’s assets, stating that more tangible assets 
support more external financing. They used the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
idea that investment-cash flow sensitivities do not need to decrease with 
variables that relieve financing constraints. In this study, they verify their 
proposed hypothesis that asset tangibility increases investment-cash flow 
sensitivities for financially constrained firms, but this does not seem to happen 
when analyzing unconstrained firms. Therefore, firms with more tangible assets 
are less likely to be financially constrained. 
                                                        
7
 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are the main “rivals” of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) theory. These 
authors defend that sensitivity of investment to cash flow cannot be an indication for the existence of 
financial constraints. 
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B.1.3. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 
 One of the factors that are taken into account when evaluating firms’ 
financial constraints is the amount of liquid assets. According to Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004) firms have the tendency to save cash when 
they face financial constraints because the investment expenditure in the future 
will depend on the firms’ internal funds. They study the connection between 
financial constraints and firms’ demand for liquidity, and propose a new theory 
of the impact of financial constraints on firm policies. Their results suggest that 
financially constrained firms should increase their tendency to retain cash after 
negative economic shocks, while unconstrained firms should not. When firms 
have more cash flows, they should have a higher amount of liquid assets. This 
means that financially constrained firms should present a positive cash flow 
sensitivity of cash, i.e., constrained firms should have propensity to save cash 
out of cash inflows, while unconstrained firms should not have that propensity. 
 Following the idea of Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), Denis 
and Sibilkov (2009) show that if constrained firms hold cash out of their cash 
flows they are increasing their value, since it gives them the opportunity to take 
valuable investments, and by retaining cash, they can lessen the consequences 
of financial constraints. So, if constrained firms have low cash then they have 
lower cash-cash flow sensitivity than high cash constrained firms.8 
 These three measures of financial constraints appear to be the most 
adequate for the purpose of this study. The option to use these them is due to 
the fact that what is done in this dissertation is very similar to the analysis of 
Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015). These authors analyze the effects of 
acquisitions of private target firms on their financial constraints and evaluate if 
the financial management decisions of target firms change when the firm is 
acquired being consistent with the idea of a less financially constrained firm. 
They reach the conclusion that after an acquisition the targets’ cash holdings 
decrease and the sensitivities of cash and investment to cash flow also 
                                                        
8
 Denis and Sibilkov (2009) 
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decrease. Thus, before the acquisition target firms are financially constrained, 
but after the acquisition those constraints are reduced. 
 In this dissertation, instead of testing the effects of acquisitions on private 
target firms’ financial constraints, are tested the effects of the financial crisis and 
the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on private firms and, 
particularly, SMEs’ financial constraints. Since, Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) 
also analyze private firms, their work uses the appropriate methodology to 
follow in this study. 
 
B.2. Sovereign Credit Rating 
 
 A sovereign rating is a way of evaluating the state of a country and the 
conditions that it has to fulfill its commitments towards its lenders. To do a 
qualitative and quantitative assessment, rating agencies consider several 
social, political and economic factors. There are eight significant variables that 
S&P and Moody’s consider in their rating evaluation: income per capita, GDP 
growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt, economic 
development and default history.9 
 Although sometimes these ratings can worsen the situation of a country by 
giving the information to investors when a country is not capable of complying 
with its duties, usually governments want to have credit ratings so that they can 
have easier access to international capital markets. But has it happens to a 
country to have an upgrade in their credit rating, it can also happen to have a 
downgrade, which can lead investors to notice a higher country risk and to raise 
the risk premium charged to the borrowers, making domestic firms’ credit more 
costly (Arteta and Hale, 2008). This meets the results of Borensztein, Cowan 
and Valenzuela (2013) that sovereign credit rating changes have impact on 
corporate ratings. This impact can be positive or negative if there is, 
respectively, an upgrade or a downgrade of the sovereign credit rating. 
Changes in the sovereign rating have more impact on firms if there is a 
                                                        
9
 Cantor and Packer (1996) 
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downgrade instead of an upgrade10. One of the impacts that downgrades have 
is for example the spillover effect across countries that can lead to financial 
instability. A sovereign rating downgrade in a country can affect banks of 
another country that holds debt of that country. This happened in the 2007-2009 
financial crisis where several countries experienced one after another the 
sovereign credit rating downgrade. There is evidence that rating downgrades of 
Greece had spillover effects in Portugal and Spain. These results are shown in 
Missio and Watzka (2011), who conclude that some of the financial problems 
that Greece was facing spread out to other European countries. According to 
Arezki, Candelon and Sy (2011), these spillover effects depend on the type of 
rating announcements, on the source of country experiencing the downgrade 
and on the rating agency where were originated the announcements. 
 Sovereign credit rating downgrades have several effects not only on the 
population of the downgraded country that sometimes go through difficulties 
because of the policies imposed by the government but also on companies that 
see their corporate rating downgrade as well because of the sovereign ceiling 
rule (i.e., no company can have a credit rating higher than the sovereign credit 
rating) and the market conditions associated to the sovereign downgrade11. So, 
what are the effects that sovereign credit rating downgrades have on the firms 
of those countries? Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira and Restrepo (2014) try to answer 
this question and find some important effects of sovereign credit rating 
downgrades on companies. For instance, credit rating downgrades can affect 
the access of the firm to the bond and commercial paper markets because the 
rating level is a way for institutional investors to see if they can invest in the 
firm’s securities. The fact that companies have difficulties in the access to 
financing makes them to save an amount of cash available to finance future 
investments, which is what happens when companies are financially 
constrained. Another effect is that when institutional investors invest in a firm, 
the capital requirements that they are liable to can be affected by the sovereign 
credit rating downgrade. The credit downgrade gives information about a firm’s 
credit quality to the market, which as a consequence can change a firm’s cost of 
                                                        
10
 Borensztein, Cowan and Valenzuela (2013), p.4019 
11
 Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira and Restrepo (2014) 
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capital. This meets the idea of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) that 
difficulties in the access to external financing makes firms struggle to react to 
the changes in the cost of capital. With the firms being constrained in their 
capacity to increase their external financing, they have to resort to internal 
financing so that they can invest and, therefore, this makes their investment-
cash flow sensitivity increase. The downgrade can even affect the relationship 
and business operations between employees and customers since it can be 
difficult to enter or to maintain a business contract if the company is going 
through a credit rating downgrade. This can have consequences as making 
companies reduce their debt issuances, leverage and also investment. 12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12
 Kisgen (2009) 
THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS OF PORTUGUESE SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
 
 25 
C. Data Description 
 
 The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of 
economic and financial crisis on the financial constraints of Portuguese small 
and medium enterprises. Thus, to study this issue on privately held firms it is 
necessary to use a database that contains financial information of those firms. 
Every year, all European companies, public and private, have to make public all 
their financial information for everyone to have access to it, and one of the 
sources that place that information at our disposal is the Amadeus database. It 
focus mainly on private firms and contains the financial information of about 21 
million European companies. Because of this large amount of companies that 
Amadeus provides us, I decided to use this database to collect all the data of 
Portuguese companies. 
 The private firms in analysis in this dissertation are all Portuguese. One 
might think that Portugal is a small market to analyze comparatively to some 
bigger countries that could give more accurate results because of the higher 
amount of observations that could be collected, but Portugal was one of the 
most affected countries by the global financial crisis, and so it is important to 
know more about how companies were affected by the crisis. 
 The data collected has some basic features that the companies in 
analysis should present. There are four characteristics that all companies 
should have, they should be all Portuguese, have a minimum of 10 employees, 
and should not be listed companies and not be subsidiaries. In what concerns 
subsidiaries, in Amadeus we can select two types of companies according to 
their ultimate owner. We can choose firms with a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) 
or a Domestic Ultimate Owner (DUO). A GUO is defined as the highest parent 
company within a corporate family, i.e., the ultimate owner that owns more than 
25% of the company. A DUO is a subsidiary within a corporate family that is the 
highest subsidiary located in a specific country. In this study are used only firms 
that fit into the definition of a GUO because the goal is to analyze only parent 
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companies and not their subsidiaries. This screening procedure leads to a final 
sample of 947 Portuguese firms. 
 The sample period covered in this dissertation is from 2004 to 2013.  A 
period of ten years is used because the financial crisis hit in 2008 and with this 
range of years before and after 2008, will allow to have a sufficient amount of 
information and to obtain more accurate results.  
 This dissertation analyzes the financial constraints of private firms and, 
particularly, SMEs after the financial crisis and the Portuguese sovereign credit 
rating downgrade in 2011. To define properly the concept of small and medium 
enterprises, it was taken into account the definition presented in the article nº 2 
of the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of May 6, 2003. According 
to this, the definition of SMEs takes into account the number of employees and 
their turnover or annual balance sheet. It is stated in article nº 2 that small 
enterprises are composed by less than 50 employees and the annual turnover 
does not exceed the value of €10 million, and medium enterprises have less 
than 250 employees and a turnover lower than €50 million. When these 
characteristics are considered, the sample of firms is reduced to 903 SMEs.  
 Hence, this data sample of private firms and SMEs is used in this 
dissertation to analyze the impact of the financial crisis and the 2011 
Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on its financial constraints. 
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D. Methodology 
 
 Firms sometimes face financial constraints, i.e., they suffer financial 
frictions that make them deviate from good investment opportunities. There are 
several models to measure financial constraints. Followed by some critics as 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Alti (2003) or Moyen (2004), Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) introduce one of the first measures concerning firms’ financial 
constraints. They estimate the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its cash flow, 
i.e., variations in cash flow affect more the investment of constrained firms than 
that of less constrained firms, and so financial constraints have an important 
role on firms’ investment capacity.  
 Another method to measure financial constraints is to estimate a firm’s 
propensity to save cash from incremental cash flows.13 Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) suggest that if a firm is financially constrained it will have the 
tendency to save cash out of cash flows, while unconstrained firms do not have 
a relation between cash flows and their propensity to save cash. When the firm 
is financially constrained, the firm will prefer to allocate additional cash flows to 
increase their investments now and in the future. Therefore, the influence of 
constraints on today’s investment is determined by the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment, while the cash flow sensitivity of cash reflects the management’s 
assessment of future constraints. 
 In this dissertation, the model to measure financial constraints that is 
followed is the one of Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015). This because they study 
privately held firms and they did not follow measures of financial constraints that 
are used only for public firms. So, since in this dissertation I analyze small and 
medium size Portuguese enterprises the model should be adequate to this type 
of companies.  Therefore, this study uses the same measures of Erel, Jang and 
Weisbach (2015), which are the level of cash holdings, the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, and the cash-cash flow sensitivity. 
 To analyze the impact of the Portuguese crisis on the financial constraints 
                                                        
13
 Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 
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of SMEs, three hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis is if the demand for cash 
holding increases when financial constraints increase, which according to the 
literature if the firm is financially constrained the cash holdings of the firm should 
increase. Another hypothesis is whether constrained firms save cash from 
incremental cash flows to finance future investments. The theory suggests that 
in financially constrained firms the change in the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
should reflect changes in financial constraints, i.e., firms that are constrained 
should have an amount of incremental cash flows as cash so that future 
investments can be financed (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004). The 
last hypothesis is if there is a link between the investment and the cash flow of a 
financially constrained firm. According to the theory, when there are financial 
constraints, the firms’ cash flow sensitivity of investment should increase. 
 The procedure to estimate the three measures of financial constraints is in 
accordance with the methodology used by Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015), but 
while they study the impact of acquisitions on target firms’ financial constraints, 
here I analyze the financial constraints of SMEs before and after the 2008 
financial crisis and the 2011 sovereign credit rating downgrade. First, it is 
considered the level of cash holdings, i.e., if the demand for holding cash 
increases when financial constraints increase after the crisis or the downgrade, 
we should observe that firms’ cash holdings rise after the crisis or the 
downgrade. To test this, the quantity of cash is estimated as follows: 
���� = �+ �� �����+ �� ��������+  � 
 In the equation, AFTER is a binary variable that has the value of zero 
before the crisis (or downgrade) and the value of one after the crisis (or 
downgrade). One of the years that is considered to this analysis is 2008 when 
the crisis began, and another important year is 2011 because of the sovereign 
credit rating downgrade that made Portugal fall to one of its lowest rating levels 
(Speculative grade) since the beginning of the crisis. It also includes six firm 
level controls (total assets, cash flow normalized by total assets, ROA, number 
of employees, sales growth and leverage) and three country level controls 
(private credit to GDP, market capitalization to GDP and GDP growth). 
 (1) 
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 Second, I will analyze the cash flow sensitivity of cash. To estimate this, 
Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) follow the methodology of Almeida, Campello 
and Weisbach (2004), which suggests that constrained firms retain an amount 
in cash of incremental cash flows to finance future investments. Along with 
other literature, they state that the sensitivity of cash holdings to incremental 
cash flows is correlated with other measures of financial constraints. Therefore, 
the change in the cash flow sensitivity of cash when the acquisition occurs 
should reflect changes in financial constraints at that time.14 This is what should 
also occur after the financial crisis and the sovereign credit rating downgrade. 
To measure the change in the cash flow sensitivity of cash, I will follow the idea 
of Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) by considering the coefficient on cash flow 
divided by assets as the cash flow sensitivity of assets before the crisis, and the 
sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on cash flow interacted with the 
AFTER dummy variable as the sensitivity after the Portuguese crisis or the 
downgrade. 
 Therefore, the equation to analyze the cash flow sensitivity of cash is the 
following: 
∆ ���� �������� = �+  �� �����+ �� ����� � ���� ����+
 �� ��������+  � 
 Finally, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is considered. The idea 
underlying this is that if a firm is financially constrained, an increase in cash flow 
will allow the firm to accept more projects. In this way, if the firm is financially 
constrained, it should be noticed a link between a firm’s investment and its cash 
flow.15 In order to measure the cash flow sensitivity of investment, Erel, Jang 
and Weisbach (2015) used the same measure as for the cash flow sensitivity of 
cash with investment as the dependent variable, which is the gross 
investment16 divided by the total assets, and in this dissertation is also used this 
method as demonstrated in the following equation: 
 
                                                        
14
 Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Following the theory of Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015): Gross Investment = (Fixed Assets – Lagged 
Fixed Assets + Depreciation)/Total Assets 
(2) 
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����� ���������� =  �+  �� �����+ �� ����� � ���� ����+
 �� ��������+  � 
 In both regressions of cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash flow 
sensitivity of investment, the country and firm level controls are the same as in 
the cash holdings regression but with the difference that, because of the high 
correlation between the variables Cash Flow and ROA, the firm level control 
ROA is replaced by the AFTER dummy interacted with cash flow, which 
represents the cash flow sensitivity of cash and the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment after 2008 or after the sovereign credit rating downgrade. 
 These regressions are applied in two different situations. First, are used to 
test the effect that the financial crisis had on the financial constraints of private 
firms and in particular SMEs, and to do this is considered the period of 2004 to 
2013. Second, are applied to test the impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit 
rating downgrade in 2011 on the financial constraints of private firms and also 
only on SMEs’ financial constraints. In this case the period in analysis is from 
2009 to 2013 so that I can analyze two years before and two years after the 
sovereign credit rating downgrade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
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E. Results 
  In this section are displayed the results obtained in this study about the 
impact of the crisis and the sovereign credit rating downgrade on the financial 
constraints of Portuguese enterprises. First, the summary statistics before and 
after the crisis and the downgrade are presented, and finally are showed the 
results of the impact of the crisis and the 2011 Portuguese sovereign credit 
rating downgrade on the financial constraints of private firms and, particularly, of 
small and medium enterprises. 
 
E.1. Summary Statistics 
 
 This subsection presents the data summary statics before and after 2008 
financial crisis and 2011 sovereign credit rating downgrade (Table 2). Observe 
that after 2008 the number of observations increased probably because some 
values are missing mainly in the years of 2004 and 2005 of some companies. 
But, after the sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2011, the number of 
observations decreased significantly. A possible reason for this could be the 
entrance of European institutions and the IMF and the severe measures that 
came with it, which led some companies to cease their activities, as we have 
seen in Table 1 of section A. 
 The mean of Total Assets, Number of Employees and Cash increases 
after 2008 and after 2011 the same occurs with the exception of the Cash that 
decreases. The Gross Investment, Cash Flow, ROA and Leverage mean 
decreases after 2008 and 2011. Firms invested more of their assets before 
2008 (13%) than before 2011 (11%) having these numbers decreased 8pp after 
each event. Similarly, the median of Total Assets and Number of Employees 
increases and all the other medians decrease after the two events, with the 
exception of Cash that does not vary. The same as the median occurs to the 
standard deviation of Total Assets and Number of Employees, which is defined 
as the degree to which the values in the sample differ from the mean, but the 
variable Cash, Cash flow and ROA do not change, while Leverage increases 
after the two events and Sales Growth decrease after 2011. 
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Table 2 – Firm level variables summary statistics 
Summary statistics on the firm level variables before and after the 2008 financial crisis and the 
2011 sovereign credit rating downgrade. Data collected from Amadeus database and the 
variables of Total assets, Cash/Total Assets, Gross Investment/Total Assets, Cash Flow/ Total 
Assets, ROA, Sales Growth and Leverage are in million EUR. 
 
Panel A – Before 2008 
 Before 2008 
 
N mean median sd 
Total Assets 3844 8.38 3.92 14.80 
Number of employees 2712 60.99 32 82.27 
Cash/Total Assets 3836 0.07 0.03 0.11 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
4735 0.13 0.04 0.20 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 3766 0.08 0.07 0.08 
ROA 3719 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Sales Growth 4735 0.07 0.00 0.30 
Leverage 2768 0.65 0.68 0.18 
 
 
    
Panel B – After 2008 
 After 2008 
 
N mean median sd 
Total Assets 4730 10.06 4.62 16.79 
Number of Employees 4723 64.60 35 85.01 
Cash/Total Assets 4726 0.08 0.03 0.11 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
4735 0.05 0.02 0.10 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 4689 0.05 0.04 0.08 
ROA 4689 0.07 0.06 0.09 
Sales Growth 4735 0.02 -0.007 0.32 
Leverage 3966 0.61 0.63 0.21 
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Panel C – Before 2011 
 Before 2011 
 
N mean median sd 
Total Assets 6680 9.04 4.19 15.68 
Number of employees 5541 63.07 34 83.76 
Cash/Total Assets 6670 0.08 0.03 0.11 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
7576 0.11 0.04 0.18 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 6578 0.07 0.06 0.08 
ROA 6531 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Sales Growth 7576 0.07 0.00 0.31 
Leverage 5097 0.64 0.66 0.19 
 
 
 
 
    
Panel D – After 2011 
 After 2011 
 
N mean median sd 
Total Assets 1894 10.26 4.62 16.85 
Number of employees 1894 63.90 34 84.84 
Cash/Total Assets 1892 0.07 0.03 0.11 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
1894 0.03 0.01 0.09 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 1877 0.04 0.03 0.08 
ROA 1877 0.06 0.06 0.09 
Sales Growth 1894 -0.009 -0.027 0.29 
Leverage 1637 0.60 0.62 0.22 
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E.2. Analysis of the Results 
 
 This subsection shows the analysis of the results. The following tables 
display the outcomes obtained with the estimation of the regressions described 
in the previous section D. 
 The results presented are for the period before and after the beginning of 
the global financial crisis in 2008 and for the period before and after the 
sovereign credit rating downgrade that led Portugal from Investment Grade to 
Speculative Grade in 2011. Besides these two periods of analysis, I also 
analyze separately for all the Portuguese private firms and for small and 
medium enterprises. 
 
E.2.1. Financial Crisis 
 
 In table 3 are presented the results for the impact of the crisis on cash 
holdings of private firms. We can see the effect on cash holdings by looking at 
the AFTER dummy variable, which represents the cash holdings after the 2008 
crisis. This coefficient is negative between -0.0081 and -0.0023. The meaning of 
this is that after the financial crisis private firms reduced their level of cash 
holdings between 0.23pp and 0.81pp, but this drop in cash holdings is not 
statistically significant. 
 These results are not the expected for firms facing financial constraints, 
since when the firms face constraints their cash holdings should increase 
instead of decreasing. Therefore, this is a suggestion that firms were not 
financially constrained after the financial crisis. 
 After analyzing the impact on cash holdings, the analysis of the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment are displayed. Table 4 
shows the results of these two factors. The cash-cash flow sensitivity is 
represented in the columns (1) and (2), and the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is represented in the columns (3) and (4). 
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 As mentioned in the previous section D, the coefficient on cash flow 
divided by assets represents the cash flow sensitivity of assets before the crisis, 
and the coefficient on cash flow interacted with the AFTER dummy variable 
represents the sensitivity of cash17 after the Portuguese crisis. 
 Therefore, the coefficient on cash flow normalized by assets (sensitivity 
before the crisis) is positive and statistically significant leading to the conclusion 
that before the crisis firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash increased, i.e., firms 
were financially constrained. However, the AFTER coefficient interacted with the 
cash flow coefficient (sensitivity after the crisis) had a statistically significant 
decline between 8.15pp and 25.93pp, so firms were not financially constrained 
after the crisis. In financially constrained firms the change in the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash should reflect changes in financial constraints, i.e., firms that 
are constrained should have an amount of incremental cash flows as cash so 
that future investments can be financed18, and in this case this does not happen 
because firms do not save an amount of incremental cash flows as cash. 
 If we look at columns (3) and (4) of table 4, where are presented the 
results for the cash flow sensitivity of investment, we can see that the results 
are the same as in columns (1) and (2), but when all firm level variables are 
considered in the regression the results are not statistically significant. So, firms’ 
cash flow sensitivity of investment declines, which is an indication that the 
companies were not financially constrained after the crisis. 
 The results of table 4 are in accordance with the ones of table 3, since 
both results suggest that the firms are not financially constrained after the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17
 Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) 
18
 Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 
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Table 3 – The impact of the financial crisis on cash holdings of private firms 
Table of results for the impact of the crisis on Portuguese private firms cash holdings 
normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable equal to zero before 2008 and 
equal to one after 2008. All the data was collected from Amadeus database and is in million 
EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 10% of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Cash/Total Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
-0.0024 
(-0.56) 
-0.0023 
(-0.54) 
-0.0023 
(-0.54) 
-0.0081 
(-0.88) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0190*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.0195*** 
(-4,13) 
-0.0180*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.0019 
(-0.28) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets  
0.1355*** 
(6.54)  
0.0921*** 
(4.08) 
ROA  
 
0.1062*** 
(5.98)  
Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
   
-0.0061 
(-1.20) 
Sales Growth    
0.004 
(1.1) 
Leverage 
   
-0.053*** 
(-3.65) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
0.0002** 
(2.37) 
0.0003*** 
(3.10) 
0.0003*** 
(2.94) 
0.0005* 
(1.69) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.0001 
(-0.64) 
-0.0001 
(-1.19) 
-0.0001 
(-0.81) 
0.0002 
(1.20) 
GDP Growth 
0.0006 
(1.21) 
0.0002 
(0.48) 
0.0003 
(0.53) 
-0.0001 
(-0.21) 
Constant 
0.0697*** 
(4.51) 
0.0499*** 
(3.14) 
0.0486*** 
(3.05) 
0.0327 
(0.62) 
Observations 
7 616 7 506 7 459 5 063 
R2 
0.688 0.696 0.697 0.76 
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Table 4 - The impact of the financial crisis on the cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash 
flow sensitivity of investment of private firms 
Table of results for the impact of the crisis on Portuguese private firms cash-cash flow 
sensitivity (Δ Cash/Total Assets) and investment-cash flow sensitivity (Gross Investment/Total 
Assets) normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable equal to zero before 2008 
and equal to one after 2008. All the data was collected from Amadeus database and is in million 
EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 10% of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Δ Cash/Total Assets 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
0.0766*** 
(17.62) 
0.0627*** 
(6.96) 
0.2429*** 
(23.03) 
0.2579*** 
(9.93) 
AFTER x Cash Flow 
-0.2593*** 
(-8.07) 
-0.0815** 
(-2.14) 
-0.1777*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.0247 
(-0.35) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 
0.8955*** 
(33.21) 
0.8488*** 
(21.83) 
0.0725 
(1,35) 
0.0378 
(0.52) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0177*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.0128** 
(-2.27) 
0.0449*** 
(5.83) 
-0.0819*** 
(6.73) 
Ln (Number of Employees)  
-0.0174*** 
(-3.52) 
 
-0.0554*** 
(-4.43) 
Sales Growth 
 
0.0233*** 
(6.94) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.85) 
Leverage  
0.0898*** 
(5.64) 
 
0.032 
(1.01) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
-0.0016*** 
(-18.34) 
-0.0014*** 
(-5.36) 
-0.0082*** 
(-30.14) 
-0.0092*** 
(-11.04) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.0008*** 
(-9.35) 
-0.0009*** 
(-5.16) 
-0.0029*** 
(-13.60) 
-0.0039*** 
(-8.14) 
GDP Growth 
0.0027*** 
(5.73) 
0.0015** 
(2.11) 
0.0210*** 
(20.54) 
0.0219*** 
(11.66) 
Constant 
0.2418*** 
(17.31) 
0.2318*** 
(4.48) 
1.4765*** 
(31.45) 
1.8092*** 
(11.50) 
Observations 
7 515 5 067 7 515 5 067 
R2 
0.458 0.484 0.392 0.343 
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 What about small and medium enterprises? Where they affected 
differently from private firms in general? If we look only to the amount of 
companies considered as being SMEs, there are about 40 companies that are 
excluded. In order to see how their financial constraints were affected by the 
financial crisis, the same analysis is performed on SMEs. Similarly to what was 
done to private firms in general, table 5 presents the results of the impact of the 
crisis on the cash holdings of SMEs.  
 As before, we should look at the AFTER coefficient, which tell us how 
companies dealt with cash after the crisis. So, if we look at the AFTER 
coefficient we can see that it ranges between -0.014 and -0.008, meaning that 
after the crisis firms had a drop on their cash holdings between 0.08pp and 
1.4pp. With these results, we can say that small and medium enterprises did not 
save cash after the financial crisis contrary to what is expected if firms are 
facing financial constraints. 
 After testing the cash holdings of SMEs, is presented the outcome of 
SMEs’ cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment 
(Table 6). As we can observe, the coefficient that indicates the cash-cash flow 
sensitivity after the crisis (AFTER dummy interacted with cash flow) have a 
statistically significant drop between 7.57pp and 16.47pp and the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment after the crisis also decreased between 1.24pp and 
6.53pp, but not statistically significant. This indicates that SMEs were not 
financially constrained after the crisis because, if they were, the results should 
show an increase in the cash flow sensitivity of cash and an increase in the 
cash flow sensitivity of investment. 
  According to Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015), if companies are 
financially constrained their cash holdings, cash flow sensitivity of investment 
and cash flow sensitivity of cash should increase, but this is not obtained when 
looking to private firms and, particularly, small and medium enterprises after 
2008. 
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Table 5 – The impact of the financial crisis on cash holdings of small and medium 
enterprises 
Table of results for the impact of the crisis on Portuguese small and medium enterprises cash 
holdings normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable equal to zero before 
2008 and equal to one after 2008. All the data was collected from Amadeus database and is in 
million EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 
10% of significance, respectively. 
 
Cash/Total Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
-0.014 
(-1.47) 
-0.0111 
(-1.17) 
-0.0101 
(-1.06) 
-0.008 
(-0.82) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0049 
(-0.95) 
-0.0046 
(-0.90) 
-0.004 
(-0.79) 
0.0023 
(0.33) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets  
0.1399*** 
(6.71)  
0.0903*** 
(3.82) 
ROA  
 
0.1047*** 
(5.79)  
Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
   
-0.0067 
(-1.26) 
Sales Growth    
0.0044 
(1.16) 
Leverage    
-0.0509*** 
(-3.30) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
0.0006* 
(1.92) 
0.0005* 
(1.87) 
0.0005* 
(1.72) 
0.0005 
(1.61) 
Market Cap/GDP 
0.0002 
(0.97) 
0.0001 
(0.49) 
0.0001 
(0.55) 
0.0002 
(1.05) 
GDP Growth 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0003 
(-0.34) 
-0.0002 
(-0.21) 
0.0000 
(-0.01) 
Constant 
-0.0101 
(-0.19) 
-0.0152 
(-0.29) 
-0.0093 
(-0.18) 
0.0279 
(0.51) 
Observations 
6 045 5 984 5 984 4 692 
R2 
0.727 0.732 0.731 0.764 
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Table 6 - The impact of the financial crisis on the cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash 
flow sensitivity of investment of small and medium enterprises 
Table of results for the impact of the crisis on Portuguese small and medium enterprises cash-
cash flow sensitivity (Δ Cash/Total Assets) and investment-cash flow sensitivity (Gross 
Investment/Total Assets) normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable equal to 
zero before 2008 and equal to one after 2008. All the data was collected from Amadeus 
database and is in million EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, 
* for 1%, 5% and 10% of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Δ Cash/Total Assets 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
0.0891*** 
(9.98) 
0.0647*** 
(6.77) 
0.2817*** 
(11.89) 
0.2632*** 
(9.72) 
AFTER x Cash Flow 
-0.1647*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.0757* 
(-1.86) 
-0.0653 
(-1.08) 
-0.0124 
(0.17) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 
0.8621*** 
(25.92) 
0.8491*** 
(20.63) 
0.0163 
(0.27) 
0.0165 
(0.22) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0162*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.0112* 
(-1.85) 
0.0427*** 
(4.68) 
0.0829*** 
(6.94) 
Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
 
-0.0207*** 
(-3.88) 
 
-0.0558*** 
(-4.45) 
Sales Growth  
0.0239*** 
(6.77) 
 
-0,0027 
(-0.37) 
Leverage  
0.0948*** 
(5.60) 
 
0.0492 
(1.56) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
-0.0023*** 
(-8.90) 
-0.0015*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.0101*** 
(-13.45) 
-0.0095*** 
(-10.96) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.0013*** 
(-7.30) 
-0.0010*** 
(-5.20) 
-0.0045*** 
(-10.06) 
-0.0041*** 
(-8.24) 
GDP Growth 
0.0035*** 
(5.07) 
0.0016** 
(2.24) 
0.0223*** 
(13.17) 
0.0218*** 
(11.26) 
Constant 
0.3831** 
(8.08) 
0.2504*** 
(4.59) 
1.8677*** 
(13.60) 
1.8617*** 
(11.48) 
Observations 
5 990 4 696 5 990 4 696 
R2 
0.438 0.486 0.339 0.36 
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E.2.2. Portuguese Sovereign Credit Rating 
 
 In 2011, the Portuguese sovereign credit rating suffered a downgrade 
and Portugal saw its rating go from Investment Grade to Speculative Grade (or 
as it is commonly called “junk” bond). This was the year that Portugal had to be 
rescued by the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and 
European Commission. These three institutions had the purpose to 
economically restructure Portugal so that it could honor its commitments. But 
this has caused many difficulties to companies and a lot of them were not able 
to survive to all the austerity that the European institutions and the IMF imposed 
to Portugal. 
 The following tables show how was the impact of the 2011 Portuguese 
sovereign credit rating downgrade on the financial constraints of private firms in 
general and, in particular, of small and medium enterprises. First are displayed 
the results of the impact on financial constraints of private firms. In table 7 we 
can see that the cash holdings decreased between 0.41pp and 0.76pp after the 
downgrade occurred, being an indication that private firms were not financially 
constrained after the downgrade. Columns (1), (3) and (4) present statistically 
significant results of the AFTER coefficient, while column (2) result is not 
statistically significant. 
 Subsequently, table 8 shows that the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
declined between 4.63pp and 17.25pp. Although the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment also faces a drop, the values are not statistically significant. 
 These results on private firms indicate that after the Portuguese 
sovereign credit rating downgrade they were not financially constrained since 
their cash holdings, cash-cash flow sensitivity and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity decreased instead of increasing as it was expected if the firms were 
constrained. 
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Table 7 - The impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on cash 
holdings of private firms 
Table of results for the impact of the crisis on Portuguese private firms cash holdings 
normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable equal to zero before 2011 and 
equal to one after 2011. All the data was collected from Amadeus database and is in million 
EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 10% of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Cash/Total Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
-0.0076*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.0041 
(-1.44) 
-0.0053* 
(-1.86) 
-0.0063** 
(-2.39) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0187*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.0193*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.0177*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.0009 
(-0.14) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets  
0.1331*** 
(6.37)  
0.0854*** 
(3.72) 
ROA  
 
0.1042*** 
(5.84)  
Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
   
-0.0065 
(-1.28) 
Sales Growth    
0.0042 
(1.15) 
Leverage    
-0.0564*** 
(-3.81) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
0.0002*** 
(3.82) 
0.0003*** 
(5.21) 
0.0002*** 
(4.95) 
0.0002*** 
(3.26) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.0001 
(-0.66) 
-0.0001 
(-1.26) 
-0.0001 
(-0.87) 
0.0001 
(0.97) 
GDP Growth 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0000 
(-0.00) 
-0.0001 
(-0.19) 
-0.0003 
(-0.53) 
Constant 
0.0766*** 
(8.23) 
0.0570*** 
(5.75) 
0.0557*** 
(5.58) 
0.0798*** 
(3) 
Observations 
7 616 7 506 7 459 5 063 
R2 
0.688 0.696 0.697 0.76 
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Table 8 - The impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating on the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment of private firms 
Table of results for the impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on private 
firms cash-cash flow sensitivity (Δ Cash/Total Assets) and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
(Gross Investment/Total Assets) normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy variable 
equal to zero before 2011 and equal to one after 2011. All the data was collected from Amadeus 
database and is in million EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the symbols ***, **, 
* for 1%, 5% and 10% of significance, respectively. 
 
Δ Cash/Total Assets 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
0.0268*** 
(8.23) 
0.0240*** 
(7.05) 
-0.0071 
(-1.19) 
-0.0250*** 
(-4.02) 
AFTER x Cash Flow 
-0.1725*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.0463 
(-0.96) 
-0.048 
(-0.63) 
-0.0009 
(-0.01) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 
0.7976*** 
(35.42) 
0.8308*** 
(25.68) 
-0,0201 
(-0.46) 
0.0168 
(-0.29) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0254*** 
(-7.20) 
-0.0180*** 
(-3.26) 
0.0296*** 
(3.77) 
0.0785*** 
(6.26) 
Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
 
-0.0166*** 
(-3.37) 
 
-0.0574*** 
(-4.44) 
Sales Growth  
0.0226*** 
(6.73) 
 
-0.0096 
(-1.39) 
Leverage  
0.1033*** 
(6.59) 
 
0.0126 
(0.38) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
-0.0004*** 
(-9.18) 
0.0003*** 
(3,68) 
-0.0038*** 
(-27.36) 
-0.0018*** 
(-10.35) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.0006*** 
(-6.97) 
0.0000 
(-0.11) 
-0.0019*** 
(-9.19) 
0.0005** 
(2.29) 
GDP Growth 
0.0009* 
(1.88) 
0.0000 
(-0.05) 
0.0061*** 
(6.22) 
0.0031*** 
(2.98) 
Constant 
-0.0810** 
(8.73) 
-0.0799*** 
(-3.11) 
0.8165*** 
(29.43) 
0.4825*** 
(8.11) 
Observations 
7 515 5 067 7 515 5 067 
R2 
0.431 0.486 0.337 0.318 
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 As previously referred, 40 companies are excluded when considering only 
small and medium enterprises. Although this may not change significantly the 
results, it is important to see if there are changes when we only look at SMEs. 
Therefore, in tables 9 and 10 are displayed the results of the sovereign credit 
rating downgrade impact on financial constraints of small and medium 
enterprises. 
 In this case, the after downgrade coefficient is also negative and 
statistically significant. Table 9 shows that there is a drop in cash holdings 
between 0.55pp and 0.94pp, which means that SMEs were not financially 
constrained after the downgrade. 
 Another evidence of this is the variation on cash holdings that show the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash. The coefficient indicating the sensitivity after the 
downgrade is the one that AFTER interacts with cash flow, and it is a 
statistically significant negative coefficient meaning that the sensitivity 
decreased between 5.97pp and 14.87pp, indicating that firms were not 
financially constrained. However, when looking to the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment the coefficient is positive, but these results are not statistically 
different from zero (see Table 10). 
 These results obtained are not what were expected for the hypotheses 
defined previously. Since cash holdings, cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash 
flow sensitivity of investment decrease in all scenarios analyzed, this means 
that after the financial crisis and after the sovereign credit rating downgrade in 
2011, firms were not financially constrained. 
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Table 9 - The impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on cash 
holdings of small and medium enterprises 
Table of results for the impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on small 
and medium enterprises cash holdings normalized by total assets, being the AFTER dummy 
variable equal to zero before 2011 and equal to one after 2011. All the data was collected from 
Amadeus database and is in million EUR. The statistical significance is represented by the 
symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 10% of significance, respectively. 
 
Cash/Total Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
-0.0094*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.0055* 
(-1.93) 
-0.0068** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0067** 
(-2.40) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0042 
(-0.82) 
-0.0041 
(-0.81) 
-0.0035 
(-0.69) 
0.0032 
(0.47) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets  
0.1363*** 
(6.48)  
0.0831*** 
(3.46) 
ROA  
 
0.1018*** 
(5.6)  
Ln (Number of Employees)    
-0.0072 
(-1.35) 
Sales Growth    
0.0046 
(1.22) 
Leverage    
-0.0546*** 
(3.47) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
0.0002** 
(2.12) 
0.0002*** 
(3.04) 
0.0002*** 
(2.86) 
0.0002*** 
(3.14) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.00003 
(-0.31) 
-0.0001 
(-0.74) 
-0.0001 
(-0.47) 
0.0001 
(0.77) 
GDP Growth 
-0.0001 
(-0.14) 
-0.0001 
(-0.13) 
-0.0002 
(-0.31) 
-0.0002 
(-0.33) 
Constant 
0.0630*** 
(4.05) 
0.0432*** 
(2.77) 
0.0439*** 
(2.79) 
0.0749*** 
(2.94) 
Observations 
6 045 5 984 5 984 4 692 
R2 
0.728 0.732 0.731 0.765 
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Table 10 - The impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on the cash 
flow sensitivity of cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment of small and medium 
enterprises 
Table of results for the impact of the Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade on small 
and medium enterprises cash-cash flow sensitivity (Δ Cash/Total Assets) and investment-cash 
flow sensitivity (Gross Investment/Total Assets) normalized by total assets, being the AFTER 
dummy variable equal to zero before 2011 and equal to one after 2011. All the data was 
collected from Amadeus database and is in million EUR. The statistical significance is 
represented by the symbols ***, **, * for 1%, 5% and 10% of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Δ Cash/Total Assets 
Gross Investment/Total 
Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AFTER 
0.0227*** 
(6.49) 
0.0248*** 
(6.92) 
-0.0218 
(-3.64) 
-0.0254*** 
(-3.89) 
AFTER x Cash Flow 
-0.1487** 
(-2.95) 
-0.0597 
(-1.17) 
0.029 
(0.37) 
0.00455 
(0,53) 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 
0.7999*** 
(30.36) 
0.8363*** 
(24.54) 
-0.0472 
(-1.01) 
-0,0234 
(-0.40) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
-0.0211*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.0161*** 
(-2.72) 
0.0353*** 
(3.79) 
0.0788*** 
(6.38) 
Ln (Number of Employees)  
-0.0196*** 
(-3.70) 
 
-0.0577*** 
(-4.42) 
Sales Growth  
0.0229*** 
(6.50) 
 
-0.0065 
(-0.91) 
Leverage  
0.1082*** 
(6.49) 
 
 
0.0313 
(0.94) 
Private Credit/ GDP 
-0.00005 
(-0.74) 
0.0002*** 
(3.21) 
-0.0021*** 
(-13.60) 
-0.0019*** 
(-10.42) 
Market Cap/GDP 
-0.00004 
(-0.39) 
-0.0000 
(-0.26) 
0.0003 
(1.61) 
0.0004* 
(1.89) 
GDP Growth 
0.0001 
(0.15) 
0.0000 
(0.08) 
0.0024** 
(2.55) 
0.0027** 
(2.54) 
Constant 
-0.0192 
(-1.34) 
-0.0758*** 
(-2.75) 
0.4112*** 
(13.27) 
0.4909*** 
(8.27) 
Observations 
5 990 4 696 5 990 4 696 
R2 
0.428 0.488 0.309 0.333 
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  The results obtained reject the three hypotheses proposed initially that 
the cash holdings, the cash flow sensitivity of cash and the cash flow sensitivity 
of investment should increase when firms are financially constrained. In order to 
withdraw all the doubts about survivorship bias that could influence the results, I 
performed a robustness test to confirm it. To conduct this test I excluded the 
firms that were not active three years before and three years after the financial 
crisis and the total number of firms was reduced to 654. However, even with 
only the companies that survived the outcome was the same, i.e., the firms’ 
cash holdings, cash-cash flow sensitivity and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
continued to decline. Therefore, the results were not influenced by a 
survivorship bias and this confirms that firms were actually not financially 
constrained after the financial crisis and the sovereign credit rating downgrade. 
 In a way to understand the cause of this outcome, I tested if companies 
were even more leveraged after the crisis and the downgrade by including the 
coefficient AFTER x Leverage (leverage after the crisis and the downgrade), but 
the results showed that the leverage of firms decreased, meaning that 
companies were less levered after the two events. One explanation for this 
could be the fact that after the crisis Portugal tried to provide some measures 
that could give support to SMEs by creating “PME Crescimento” (“SME 
Growth”), which still exists today. This program was built to help SMEs to 
internationalize, innovate and to help them pay debts contracted towards the 
Government.19 This could be one of the reasons why firms behaved this way, 
but it is not the only reason. 
 These results can also mean that companies were in a situation even 
worse than expected, so they could not use the cash to finance future 
investments and the cash flows generated were not used to invest, probably 
because the money was needed to pay debts and other priorities that 
companies had. Thus, companies were not able to save cash to prevent for 
future needs and therefore had to direction their money to pay urgent 
obligations towards lenders, employees, suppliers, etc. that needed to be 
fulfilled. 
                                                        
19
 2014 Small Business Act (SBA) Fact Sheet – Portugal. The SBAs are a way to gather information about 
how SMEs of each Member State are evolving in a way to see which policies should be applied. 
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F. Final Conclusions 
 
 The recent financial crisis in Europe has caused many damages on 
companies, some were able to fight it but others did not have that possibility. 
Portugal was one of the countries that was most affected by the crisis, and 
along with it companies saw the need to take some actions to fight against the 
barriers they faced. It is true that all companies suffered but some of them did 
not had the capacity to swim against the tide, hence some survived and others 
did not. 
 In a way to understand how private companies and particularly SMEs 
were affected by this financial crisis, the purpose of this dissertation was to look 
at the financial constraints of these companies and analyze if they were 
financially constrained or unconstrained after the financial crisis and after the 
Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade that occurred in 2011. 
 In order to analyze private firms financial constraints, were defined three 
hypotheses to be tested. As referred in section D, the first hypothesis was if the 
demand for cash holding increases when financial constraints also increase, the 
second hypothesis was whether constrained firms save cash of incremental 
cash flows to finance future investments, i.e., if the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
increases when firms are financially constrained, and the third hypothesis was if 
the cash flow sensitivity of investment increases when financial constrains 
increase. These three hypotheses were tested following the methodology of 
Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2015) since their work is very similar to what was 
done in this dissertation, but instead of analyzing private firms of only one 
country they study firms of several European countries. Another difference is 
that while they analyze the financial constraints after acquisitions, this 
dissertation addresses financial constraints after the financial crisis and the 
2011 sovereign credit rating downgrade. 
 The hypotheses mentioned above were tested for private firms and 
particularly for small and medium enterprises. In summary, with regard to 
private firms in general, the outcome reached was that private firms were 
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financially constrained before the crisis and the downgrade, but financially 
unconstrained after the financial crisis and after the Portuguese sovereign credit 
rating downgrade in 2011. The firms’ cash holdings, cash flow sensitivity of 
cash and cash flow sensitivity of investment decreased after the two events 
instead of increasing, which demonstrates that private firms were not financially 
constrained. 
 In what concerns SMEs, the results were not much different. Firms’ cash 
holdings, cash-cash flow sensitivity and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
decreased, but slightly more than private firms when considering cash holdings 
after the financial crisis and after the downgrade, and less than private firms 
when talking about cash-cash flow and investment-cash flow sensitivities. 
These results indicate that SMEs were not financially constrained after the crisis 
and after the downgrade. 
 When we look at both occasions after the crisis and after the 2011 
Portuguese sovereign credit rating downgrade, companies were not financially 
constrained, but before these two occasions there are indications that they 
could actually be financially constrained. This can be observed in the cash flow 
coefficient that represents the cash flow sensitivity of cash and the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment before the crisis and the downgrade. These coefficients 
are positive in these two occasions with the exception of the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment before the downgrade, which is negative but not 
statistically significant. Therefore, firms were financially constrained before the 
crisis and the downgrade, since the cash flow sensitivity of cash and cash flow 
sensitivity of investment increased before these two events. 
 After a colossal financial crisis, it was expected that firms were financially 
constrained because of the several difficulties that came with it, but this was not 
verified in this study. The reasons why this occurred can be various. The cash 
holdings of firms decreased possibly because firms had the need to spend their 
cash since loans were not very accessible and so they had to use their funds to 
sustain them. Their cash-cash flow sensitivity also decreased maybe because 
they did not have the opportunity to save an amount of incremental cash flows 
as cash to finance future investments because that cash could be used for more 
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urgent purposes. Regarding the cash flow sensitivity of investment one reason 
could be the one defended by Almeida and Campello (2007) and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) that when firms have insufficient access to credit, variables that 
increase the access of firms to external financing can also increase the 
investment of those firms, but since the access to credit decreased during the 
crisis, it could make firms decrease their investments. 
 In summary, firms were not financially constrained after the financial 
crisis and after the sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2011. But if it was 
expected that they were financially constrained because of the difficulties they 
faced, why these firms were not constrained after the crisis? This could be an 
interesting topic for future research in a way to understand why companies did 
react this way in an environment of such economic distress. 
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